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Abstract 
This paper 1s concerned with the impact of the decentralization of collective bar-
gammg at由eente中riselevel on the mternal politics of unions The paper reviews 
two bodies of hteratu田 oneon the definition of union members' interests and the 
other on the decentralization of collective bargaining On the basis of the目view.，由e
paper argues that whether the internal politics of enterprise level unions become m-
active or not depends on the perception of union members concerning the nature of 
enterprises. If they see ente中nsesas social organizations, the mternal politics of 
umons tend to be inactive If enterpns田町epe陀eivedas economic orgamzatlons, on 
the other hand, the internal politics ofunions are likely to remain active. To illustrate 
this argument, the paper briefly examines the internal politics of the UAW's local at 
NUMMI (New United Motor M血ufac佃ring,Inc , a joint venture of GM四dToyo阻）
and that of the ente中nseunion of Hitachi. 
Introduction 
In the 1980s and 1990s, mdustnal relations m North America and 、l'esternEu-
rope expenenced the decentralization of collective bargammg from the national, m-
dustrial, or sectoral levels to由C聞 te中riselevel. Corporatist町田gementsof indus-
trial 肥lationsin Sweden and Germany, once seen as the model for other industrial-
1zed countries, turned out to be rigid in their問sponsesto economic changes begin-
mngin由eearly 1980s. Consequently, they faced institutional crises, as demons住ated
by the virtual end to national-level collective bargaining between SAF and LO in 
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Sweden Previous studies attributed the decentralization of collective bargammg to 
the transition from Fordism to flexible specialization m product10n technology and 
to the decline of the Keynesian macro economic management due to increasing ex-
posure of national economies to international m町kets(e g, Katz, 1993; Iversen, 1996). 
These two factors facilitated干roduct1vity”or’＇flex1bility"coalitions at the enter-
prise level between unions (or other institutions representing workers' interests, such 
as works council) and management, particularly in expo氏ーonentedsectors In this 
alliance, umons and/or works council identified their interests with those of enter-
pnses皿dcooperated with management m increasing competitiveness by becoming 
involved in product10n-related issues (Katz, 1993; Iversen, 1996). As a田suitof the 
spread of ”ente叩nseconsciousness’f among union members, the influence of class-
or industry-based umons h出 declined.
This paper examines theoretical issues concerning the impact of the decentrali-
zauon of collective bargaining on labor movements in industrialized countries The 
argument is mamly concerned with the impact of this decentralization on mtemal 
politic芯ofunions. The mternal politics of unions are defined as the conflicts and 
compromises among factions as well as between union officials and members re 
gardmg um on policies Will the decentralizat10n of collective bargaming make the 
mtemal politics of unions, particularly those of enterprise based umons, mactive be 
cause union members supposedly share homogeneous inte問stsin the economic suc-
cess of en田中rises1Alternatively, will the internal pol山csof unions remain or be-
come active since umons continue to have a range of policy options even with decen-
tralization of collective bargainmg1 
In the paper, I review two bodies of literature one on the defimtion of union 
members' mterests and the other on the decentralization of collective bargaining On 
the basis of this review, I町・guethat whether the internal politics of enterpnse level 
unions become inactive or not depends on the pe四eptionof union members concem 
ing the natu回 of叩 te叩ris田.If they see ente中町田associal organizations, the inter 
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nal politics of umons tend to be inactive. If enterpnses are perceived as economic 
organizations, on the other hand, union politics are likely to remain active To ilus-
回te由eargument, I briefly examine the internal politics of the UAW旨localat NUMMI 
(New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., a jomt venture of GM and Toyota) and 
those of the ente中riseum on of Hitachi (one of the leading manufactures of electric 
ma chin田 mJapan) 
Theories regarding曲eDefinition of Union Members' Interes白
The internal politics of unions has received relatively litle attention in the s佃d-
1es of industnal sociology and labor politics. Previous research in these areas has 
O白entreated the internal political proc田 sof unions as a”black box," assuming that 
unions are actmg as umtary actors in their interactions with management and the 
state. 
This does not mean that previous research has paid no attention to relations w1由m
umons. Union democracy has been one of the important areas of industrial so口ol-
ogy, and the田町eseveral import四tstudies in this area, most notably出es回dyof the 
Intemat10nal Typographical Union by SM. Lipset, et al. (1956) Studi田 ofumon
democracy are concerned with relations between umon leaders and rank and file 
membe四 andwith characteristics of”a trade union government" (whether ohgarch1-
cal or democratic). However, these studies do not addre田 theissue of de日nmgthe 
mterests of umon members: while they examine how and to what extent union lead-
e四distort出emter＇明白 ofunion members, the interests of union membe田町eseen as 
given and a問 takenfor granted. This 1s because these studies take a struc同ralfunc-
tionalist view of inter田trepresentation: unions and other interest groups are sup-
posed to rep問sent”real"and ”unmediated" interests shaped by ”socio economic and 
market factors" (Berger, 1981; see also Streeck, 1988. 310-311) 
Some recent studies of unions in Western countnes have paid attention to the 
internal pohtical processes within umons, pointing out that the definition of union 
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members' interests is a cnntested process that takes the form of factmnal confhcts 
and/or tension between union leaders and rank and file memb巳四（e.g.,Golden, 1988, 
Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 1989, 1995, Yates, 1992). These authors share a common 
theoretical pe四pectivethat posits a plurality of interests withm unions and assume 
出atpolicy ch01ces made by unions largely reflect their internal political dynamics. 
In this way, recent studies of labor politics have become attentive to the "black box" 
of the internal politics ofunions. They examine the very process by which mterests 
are defined w1thm unions, no longer assuming these mteres臼tobe given. 
Then, how are the interests represented by umons definedワIwill review three 
different approaches to this issue. First, Claus Offe and Helmut W1田en血alargue 
that the interests represented by unions are defined by two different prmciples: 
monological and dialogical patterns of collective action. Monolog1cal patterns de-
日neworkers as individual p副 icipantsm the capitalist economy (i.e., sellers of labor 
power) and view their interes臼inthe same way that the capitalists’interests are 
defined. Dialogical patterns, on the other hand, construct a collective identity of 
workers as members of the working class. They argue that, while organizations of 
capital (co中orationsand business associations) are based m the monological pat 
terns of collective action, orgamzations of labor (unions) reflect both monological 
and dialogical patterns of collective action The coexistence of elements of the two 
patterns of collective action in labor organizations creates the need for these orgam-
zations to face "an ongoing contradiction between bureaucracy and mternal democ-
racy, aggregation of individual interests and formation of a collective identity”（Offe 
and Wiesenthal, 1980: esp. 97 8) Thus, the mterests ofumon members町edefined 
by politics between the two patterns of collective action, and the internal polit1cal 
processes ofunions remain active (or become active occasionally) smce it 1s d1伍c.ult
for unions to reconcile the contradictory logics of defining members' interests 
τ'he second approach to explaming the definition of interests represented by unions 
is suggested by Wolfgang Streeck. His critique of Offe and W1esenthal sugg•田tsthat 
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unions are able to reconctle the two logics of defining workers' interests in favor of 
dialogical patterns as long as union concerns stay away from production-related 1s-
SU田.This ts indicated by the fact that unions町emore encompassing in StZe than 
business associattons due to their different ranges of interests ' The inte田stscovered 
by orgamzattons of capital are more heterogeneous than those of labor since the 
former have to deal with production interests in addition to class mterests, while the 
latter are mamly concerned with class interests Thus, unions in Western coun凶es
have maintamed”class-unity”by confining their interests represented by them to 
class-related ones, i e.,to distnbutional issues m labor markets, and by refraining 
from addressing血epotentially divisive production-related mte肥sts(Streeck, 1992. 
田p.92-99) 
In the age of ”post-Fordism，＇’however, unions are no longer able to stay away 
from production-related issues, and their involvement in such issues has consider-
able impact on曲目rinternal politics Umons in many Western coun回eswere able to 
ltm1t their interest representation to distributional issues under出C阻Iativelyprosper-
ous postwar economy of the 1950s and 1960s only because distributional and pro-
duction inter回tsof labor were institutionally sep町atedby the”postwar class com-
promise”reached m many Western co四回目 In由iscompromise, employers recog-
nized血enght of umons to make distributional issues through collective b訂・gaining
in exchange for the union recognition of managerial prerogattve on production 1s-
sues. In the period of economic recession beginning in the 1970s, howeveζflexible 
production strategies have a町ectedjob and employment security for union members, 
so that unions no longer can afford to distance themselves from production issues. 
Consequently.，”class-unity”based on distributional issues has declined because pro-
duction issues have diversified among ente中risesand industries and have had far 
more divisive effects由andistributional issues on the cohesion of union movements 
(ibid.: 99・101).
Then, how does the decline of ”class unity" take place? One possibility sug-
llO 
gested by Streeck is "the gradual Japamzation of industnal relauons，”That is, work-
ers identify their interests in the survival offirms which p陪 sentlyemploy them and 
cooperate with management on production issues because ”the四leof the market 
asserts itself. .over workers' definitions of their interes凶”underconditions of eco-
nomic crisis (Streeck, 1984. 297, 304) In the context of this shift in血edefinition of 
workers' interests, the mternal politics of industry-based unions intensifies because 
union leadership is challenged from below not by militant membe四 but阻therby 
membe四 who町eintegrated m回、ooperativealliances with their employers" (ibid. 
296-7). The same scenano also points to the possible de-politicization of internal 
union poliucs after the penod of trans山on.As a result of internal politics, organiza 
uonal forms of industry-b田edunions may change from unitary org阻 izauonsto ”loose 
federations of workplace and ente中nseorganizational umts" (ibid.・313; Streeck, 
1992: 10 I) Using the terminology of 0伍band Wiesenthal, mvolvement of unions in 
production-related issues may de-polttic1ze the mternal politics of unions because 
the influence of dialogical patterns of collecuve action declines (i.e , the declme of 
class unity) and because the influence of a new verswn of monolo呂田alpatterns m-
creases. What Offe and W1esenthal seem to have in mind when they discuss the 
monological patte四sof collective action is the de白nitionof workers’interests based 
on workers as individual participants m the capitalist economy, with their p町ticipa-
tion taking place through external labor markets The new ve四ionof monological 
patterns, on the other hand, defines the mterests of union membe四 asthose of par-
ticipants in the capitalist economy at出eenterpnse level, with the1r participation 
taking place曲roughinternal labor markets of the ente叩rise.
The血irdapproach to this issue 1s suggested by Lowell Turner in his comp町ative
study of industrial relations in the auto industries of Germany and the United States 
Turner argu田 that由einstitutional町rangementsof industnal relations can check a 
tendency toward ente甲riseunionism by providing a safeguard against umons be 
coming excessively ente甲rise-onenteddue to the1r involvement in production re 
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lated issues Like Streeck, he pomts out that umons have become mcreasmgly in-
volved m production issues at the ente中nselevel, but Turner町gues曲目theintegra-
tion of unions mto the decis10n-making of management does not necess町'ilymean 
曲atunions訂eintegrated into血edecision-m出ingof management in a subordinate 
way As shown in Table I, whether阻 dhow unions are integrated into the decision-
making of manag町nentdepends on由emstitutional arrangements of industrial rela-
lions, i e , thepresence of statutory or co叩oratistregulations that”regulate firm-
level union participation from outside the firm”（Turner, 1991: 12) If such mstitu 
tional町rangementsexist, as m the case of Germany and Sweden, unions become 
mtegrat吋 intomanagenal deCISion making but, at the same time, maintain their sepa 
rate interests If the statutory or corporatist町Tangementsdo not exist, as in the case 
of the U.S and Japan, unions either a田 excludedfrom management decisions re 
garding production issues or are integrated mto the decision-making of process in a 
subordinate way. This isbecause there a悶 noinstitutional arrangements that provide 
unions with a basis independent from management (ibid.: 12-13). In other words, 
ins蜘 tional即 angementsre呂ulatethe degree to which union members ident均 their
interests with those of management as a result of bemg mtegrated into the decis10n-
making of management Turner's訂・gumentsuggests that the internal politics of en-
terprise-based unions remain active if mst1tutional E町田gementsprovide uoions with 
an mdependent basis from which some umon members express interests defined at 
mdustry or national levels of unions while others hold ente中rise-basedinterests 
Table 1 
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The曲目eapproaches to the defimtion of umon mte問stsexammed in血ISsection 
suggest conditions under which the internal politics of umons remain active or be-
come inactive. Offe and、l/1esenthalsuggest that the mtemal politics of umons町e
S町田国間Uyactive because umons are under contradictory pr出 Sur田 todefine the 
inter，田tsof their membe四int町msof both the logic of mdividual participants of the 
capitalist economy and the collective interests of the working class. Streeck sug耳目凶
出atthe involvement ofumon members m production related issues during 田onomic
cns田 even四alymakes the internal politics of enterprise-based umons inactive. Turner 
suggests that neither the structure of the cap1tahst economy nor the involvement of 
umonmembe四 inproduction-related issues per se mfluences the degree of political 
activity within unions; rather, institut10nal aπangements of industrial relations町e
the key. Thus, as long as unions are embedded in institutional arrangements that 
allow the definition of their interests to be independent仕omthose of management, 
the internal politics of enterprise-based unions may remain active even when umons 
are involved in production issues. 
It should be noted that由edecentralization of collective bargaining may under-
mine由estatutory or co中oratistinstitutional arrangements that provide unions with 
an independent basis As a literature review in the next section will show, "cross-
class”coalitions between urnons胡 dm叩 agementat the ente甲riselevel tend to weaken 
neo corporatist or industry based industrial relat10ns Although some studies show 
出eresilience of institutional arrangements even in the face of drastic economic and 
technological changes (see Thelen, 1991, for the case of the dual system in Geト
many), it may be argued that industnal relations institutions at the national and m 
dustnal levels in many industrialized countnes are experiencing increasmg internal 
strains due to thetr mflex1ble adaptation to the new contexts (Locke, 1995). If these 
mstitutional arrangements continue to dechne in the futu問，willthe interτ1al pohtics 
of umons become inactive because the terms of umon policy debate are dominated 
by the logic of m町kets,especially the logic of economic success for enterpnses? In 
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other words, will internal politics become less relevant in the definition of union 
membe日＇interests? 
Before considenng these questions further, I now turn to a literature review of 
the decentraltzation of collective bargaining. 
Review of Previous R田earchon the Decentralization of Collective Bargaming 
Students of industrial relations point to the tendency toward decentralization of 
collective bargaining in various Western countries. Harry Katz's study is the most 
comp田hensiveto date He shows that the collective bargaimng systems in Sweden, 
Australia, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the U.S have become decentralized as local 
unions have become involved in”qu叫nativeissues concerning work organization 
and work restructuring”（Katz, 1993 12). He evaluates three common explanations 
for decentralization: (I) management, taking advantage of the shift in 曲目rbalance 
of power with unions, has pushed for the decentralization of collective bargaining, 
(2) both unions and management have adapted to the growmg importance of work 
O沼田izationand shopfloor issues, formu喝、roducttvitycoalitions，＇’and (3) decen 
tralization reflects structural factors, such as changing co中oratestructures and di-
versification of workers’interests Katz argues that由e“productivitycoalitions the-
sis”is the most persuasive explanation because unions as well as management ben-
efit from出edecent四lizationof collective bargaining (ibid・ 12 17) 
Ano由erstudy出atexamines the decentralization of collective bargaining cross-
nationally is by Torben Iv町田n(1996) Ive四enshows that, while industrial relat10ns 
in many cnuntries including Sweden and Denmark have been decentralized, rela-
tions in other countries such as Norway and Austria have remained centralized or 
have become recentraltzed. He identifies three factors promoting decentraltzation 
(I) the inc問 asmgimportance of flexible specialization in production and the con-
co mi回 tneces吻 offlexiblewage systems, (2) cross-class coalitions b巳tweεn 、•o水e目
and employers in strategic sectors that町eexposed to market forces’and (3) the 
14 
change m macro-economic policies from the Keynesian, full-employment policy to 
the、on-accommodating”policyHis model of decentralizat10n of collective bar-
gaining shows that employers and workers form "flexibility coal山ons”andbreak 
away from centralized bargammg if such bargammg promotes wage leveling and 
inhibits wage flexibility. He also shows that cross class coalitions between workers 
and employers against centralized bargaming did not develop in strategic sectors m 
Austna and Norway. This W出 becausecentralized bargaining was dissociated from 
wage leveling (e g, the case of Austria) or because centralized bargaining was rem-
troduced to contam the cost-push influence of privileged“maverick”umons due to 
their wage militancy (e g, the case in Norway's oil industry). 
Ronald Dore not only shows the increasing importance of collective bargaining 
atthe ente中riselevel in such countnes as Bntam and Germany, but also argues曲目
they are moving toward the Japanese model of mdustrial relat旧ns.His discussion of 
the decentrahzat1on of collective b町gainingdi町ersfrom that of Katz and Ive四enm
the sense that Dore sees the decentralization of collective bargaining as a social, 
rather than an economic, phenomenon In his comparative study, he charactenzes 
Japanese and British firms as following a ”Community model" and a ”Company Law 
model，＂回甲田 tively,and町guesthat the latter firms町e、dgingtoward the Commu 
mty end of the spectrum.'' As evidence of this tendency, he cites the spread among 
private sector British firms of mstitutional practices commonly observed in large 
Japanese firms, includingJomt consultative committees, profit-sharing schemes, and 
abolition of the status distinction between blue and white collar workers (Dore, 1987. 
54-59). In a separate study comparing industrial relations in Germany and Japan, 
Dore charactenzes industrial回lationsm Germany as”a system of class-conscious 
labour represen阻tion”and those in Japan and the U.S. simply as "a system of labour 
representation”He argues that industrial relations in Germany are moving toward 
the later, particularly toward the Japanese version based on a strong sense of”the 
firm as community”（Dore, 1996) 
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Do田＇s町gumentfor the ”Japanization”of industrial relat10ns raises皿 1mpo民ant
issue. His町宮umentsuggests曲目notonly unions but also ente中risesare experienc-
ing changes. In his view, ente中risesm industrialized countries are becoming more 
organizatlon-onented and less market-onented (see Dore, 1973) Thus, unions have 
become integrated into ente叩riseswhose functions are not only economic but also 
social The ”cross-class cnalitions”町gumentof Katz and Iversen, in contrast, treats 
umons and management as interacting with each other as economic actors. Their 
argument suggests that unions and management form cross class coahtlons as a四
suit of rat10nal responses to economic environments and that either side may dis 
solve coalitions as econonnc conditions change. The difference between the two町－
guments is subtle but important for a theoretical d1scuss1on of the impact of the de-
centralization of collective ba屯叩ungon internal umon politics It may be argued 
that出eextent to which unions are mtegrated mto enterprises is greater when enter-
prises assume characteristics of sodαl orgamzations than when ente中risesfunctton 
mainly as economic organizations. 
The Argument. The Relevance of Politics Depends on the Perceptions of Union 
Members 
Reg町dingthe relevance of politics in the definition of um on members' mterests, 
I argue that as long as umon members perceive enterpnses as economic organiza-
tions the definition of their interests continues to be a contested process, even m the 
absence of strong statutory or corporatist institutional町rangementsThis is because 
unions face s位ategicuncert創ntyin cooperating with and opposing management Such 
uncertamty comes from the possibility that employe四 maypursue economic inter-
ests at the expense of coop町ativerelations wi由unionsby abrogating a commitment 
to employment security or by relocating plants to places where labor costs町・echeaper,
for example. Even 1f employers do not abrogate the tenns of cross class coalitions, 
union members may challenge the legitimacy of their leaders when close coopera” 
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tion between umon leaders and managers regarding productmty improvement leads 
to the intenSification of work. 
I also argue that, when union members perceive enterprises as social organiza-
lions, politics loses relevance for defining their mterests. Social organizations a白
血osein which members sh町esome sort of collective norms which suspend indi-
v1duaトorclass-based competition that is detrimental to the collectivity When enter-
prises are perceived as social organizations. unions do not face much strategic uncer 
tamty between cooperation and oppoS1t1on for two reasons. First, umon members 
叩demployers sh町ethe same social values, such as a sense of“日m咽斗commun即”
Although one may argue that such shared social values could break down, union-
management cooperat10n based on social values 1s more endunng than cross-class 
coalit凹nsbased on economic interests. Second, the distmctlon between unions and 
management becomes blurred in ente叩nsestructured as social orgamzations be-
cause such organizations emphasize egahtanan principles, e.g., the abolition of a 
distinction between staff and manual workers (see Dore, 1973. 119). As a result, the 
tenns of defining union members’mterests are likely to be dommated by the logic of 
曲eenterprise'scollective inte回sts,which in阻mnarrows血erange of strategic choices 
of enterprise-based unions. 
Two Illustrations：世田NUMMILocal of the UAW and the Hitachi Union 
The Internal Politics of the NUMMI Local 
If industrial relations in North American and Western European countries con-
tinue to be decentralized toward the ente中nselevel and if enterprise-based locals of 
industrial umons become more heavily mvolved in production issues, will the inter-
nal politics of these locals become inactive? The case of出eUAW Local at NUMMI 
(New United Motor Manufactunng, Inc.) demonstrates that the mtemal politics of 
the Local remains active, even in the absence of strong national-or industry level 
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industnal relattons institutions. NUMMI isa joint venture of GM and Toyota that 
was opened in 1984, two years a白erthe closure of the old GM plant. The new auto 
plant is widely regarded as the most successful case of an overseas transplant of 
Japanese style m阻 agement
Internal politics of the NUMMI Local remain active, even though血eLocal and 
its members have increased their involvement m production i田uesat the plant血rough
frequent union management consultations at出etop level and through a team system 
at the shopflonr level. The leadership of the Local is controll四dby the Administration 
Caucus, whtch supports consensual relations with management via the Japanese 
style system. However, there ts an opposttt0n faction (the People’s Caucus) in the 
Le cal. While the People’s Caucus also supports the broad framework of industrial 
relations at NUMMI, tts critical of the very close union-management collabo回tton
whtch, suppo口e四 ofthe People’s Caucus fe町，willthreaten independent r巳presenta-
ti on of union members' inter田ts.The group also raises specific criticisms against出e
leadership of the Local For example, it cntictzes the leadership for acceptmg faster 
speeds on the lme and greater pressure exerted on lme workers. It also cnttctzes the 
undemocratic way that the union has been led, argumg that leaders have "too many 
closed-door meetings" wt由 m胡 agementThe People's Caucus has been g包mngsup-
port among union members since 1986, receiving about 40 percent of the vote in 
union elections In 1991, the Caucus received more votes than in p田viouselections 
and won m如ykey posts in the Local (Turner, 1991. 6ιI; Turner, 1992: 234-5) 
The management of NUMMI has tned to project the vtsion of ”plant-as-commu-
nity" so that employees would be committed to the goals of higher quality and pro-
ductivity Employment security is one of the important personnel poltctes adopted by 
management in hopes of fostering a sense of community among employees. How-
ever, m血yu凶onmembers seem to be rather skeptical of由isvtsion Although m胡 age-
ment has not broken its promise of employment security, many union members feel 
that”some of the promises are wearing曲目”becauseof 可onstantpressure, the job 
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overloading, the feeling. of being pushed to the breaking point on the line" (Parker 
and Slaughter, 1988 llO Ill). It may be argued that union members, especially出ose
of the opposition faction, see management as being basically economically-moti-
vated and suspect that management may pursue economic interests even at the ex-
pense of their plant-as-community vision. Thus, the active internal politics of the 
Local can be seen as a reflection of the Local's uncertainty between strategies of 
coopera!Ion and opposition While the Administration Caucus advocates sharing 
management's values, the People’s Caucus advocates a more arm's-length relation-
ship with management This is because the latter caucus sees union-management 
田lations田 beingregulated by economic interests, believmg that the economic inter-
es ts of the union and management are not always compatible 
The Internal Poli世田ofthe Hitachi Union 
Prev10us studies of mdustnal relations in Japan suggest that unions and manage 
ment share a common social value at the enterprise level For example, Dore, in his 
study of mdustnal relations of Hitachi in comparison with English Electric, shows 
that no ”fundamental disc肥pancy”wasassumed to exist ”between the norms and 
goals of the company and those of unions”at Hitachi The function of the union was 
not to oppose management but to "see that the manage四donot make mistakes in the 
way they apply the norms or pu日uegoals on which there 1s general agreement” 
(Dore, 1993・192)The cooperative union-management relationship based on this 
shared norm made the internal politics of the umon macuve. He points out that the 
Hit印刷Union was under the control of umon leaders who cooperated with manage-
ment and that elections for union officials were rarely contested (thus md1catmg the 
absence of opposing fact10ns). He explains this lack of election contests m terms of 
the social value shared by workers and employers・ ＇・ .thegeneral view 1s that elec 
tion contests are best avmded; they are liable to leave too much bittern田sbehmdin 
a finn where the十harmony'.[1s] a regulating principle of social relations”(ibid. 
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171, 173). 
While Dore positively evaluates the industnal肥latrnnsat Hitachi based on a 
shared social value, H Kawanishi critically evaluates the role of the Hitachi union in 
曲ecompany’s industrial relations' Accordmg to Kawamshi, Hitachi's management 
adopted personnel polict田 emphasizing、senseof belonging to a gememschaft-
type community”in order to foster among employees a moral commitment to the 
company (1992: 52) The union shared wtth management a goal of making Hitachi 
an internationally competitive company, and top union leaders participated in 
management's decision-making through l・anEnterprise Management Consultative 
Committee.’I At the shopfloor level, the union emphasized giving attention to union 
members' grievances in order to improve working conditions, however, such goals 
we田 carnedout only in so faτas workers' demands would not hamper the goals of 
management, particularly productivity improvement Thus, he argues that the union 
functioned 回、nemployees organization" subordinate to the management rather 
than as a class organization independent of it (ibid. 175 251). Because the pnmary 
function of the umon was that of an employees organization, the internal politics of 
the union we田 notacttve He shows that union elections were uncontested because 
candidates for umon pos臼wereassigned through mfonnal union-management ne-
gotiat旧nsand由atunion members were generally indifferent to umon activities and 
decisions made by top union leade四 (ibid.53) 
In spite of dt町ereotinterpretations, Dore and Kawanishi seem to agree that the 
H1tach1 umon was integrated into出eenterprise through the shared value of”fimトas-
commumty’f and that this value was held not only by umon leaders but also by rank 
and file members This is indicated by Kawanishi's account of relations between 
union members and leaders He shows that union members were s町onglydissatisfied 
with the mtensification of work resultmg from the rattonalization of the productton 
process, but members did not openly cnticize union leadership. As he puts it，”［t]old 
that their own representatives had participated in making the decisions, workers had 
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httle opllon but to go along with m四 agemenトconceivedplans to rationalize produc-
tion processes and to intensify work loads”（K品•anishi, 1992・193)This r邸宅nation
of um on members to the fact that血eyhad litle control over decisions made by union 
leade四 isin sharp con汀astto the田actionof members of the NUMMI Local to the 
intensification of work As shown above, members of the Local criticized the leader-
ship for acquiescing to the speed-up of the line. Why were the問actionsof membe目
。fthe Hitachi umon and those of the NUMMI Local different? I argue that behmd 
their resignation, members of the Hitachi umon accepted the shared value of ”firnト
as community”On the basis of this value, union members accepted the mtensifica-
lion of labor田 aninevitable sacrifice in the pursuit of血ecompany's collective goal, 
1 e.,achieving greater competitiveness m internattonal markets. Conversely, mem-
be四ofthe NUMMI Local do not s田mto share common norms and goals with man-
agement, even though management 回目toinstil them Thus, I argue that the di町er-
ent levels of acttvities in the two unions' internal politics resulted from 副首erent
percepttons held by union members・ while members of the NUMMI Local saw their 
日rmas an economic organization, those of the Hitachi Union saw theirs as a social 
orgamzat10n. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I examined the cross section of two groups of research in the area 
of labor politics and industnal relations. the definition of the interests of umon mem 
bers and the decentralization of collective bargaining. I argued that the decentrahza 
tion of collective bargaining per se does not cause the internal politics of unions to be 
mactive. What makes internal politics inactive is the integration of union members 
mto ente中risesb国edon a value shared with management. I also argued that such an 
mtegration of umons into ente中risespresupposed that the ente中riseswould assume 
functions of social orgaoizat1ons m addition to those of economic orgamzat1ons. Fi-
nally, I showed that the Hitacl】iumon approximated the model of a union that is 
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”socially”integrated into an叩 te中nsebased on a sh町edvalue 
Will ente中risesin Western cot』ntriessuch as Britain and Ge口nanybecome mar ・e
s。cialy oriented and less economically-oriented, as their Japanese counte中町tssup-
posedly did? If so, will the internal politics of enterprise田basedunions m Western 
countries become inactiveワInother words, will internal pohttcs become less rel 
evant to the definition of union members' interests since employe田’ interestsare 
defined under the predominant mfluence of social values shared between umons and 
management? These are important questt0ns because, tf such changes take place, 
unions and labor movements in Western countnes will be白ndamentallytransfomned. 
Alternatively, we can ask whether socially-based mdustrtal relations in large Japa-
nese fimns, such as Hitachi, will be undemnmed by recent efforts to mc田asethe role 
of economic inte田stsin regulatmg umon-management relations, as exemplified by 
management's efforts to“restructure”their firms If so, will the mternal politics of 
enterprise unions be active? These町equesttons that futu問 studiesneed to address. 
Not回
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for hetpful comments on an mHer draf1 and Lisa 
Welch and Chikako Kashiwazaki for editorial comments 
'Offe田dWiesenthal made a theo附icalprediction出atthes』zeoflaboro喝叩tzationswould be 
smaller than that of capital町・gamzations.百1isis because, while efficieocy of capital organiza 
lions mcreases with their size, efficiency of labor organizations IS not proportionate to their 
sizes. According to them, the IO<g町thesize of labor org皿izations,the mored•『にultit becomes 
for them to construct a collective •dentity of members. In other words, the fact that labor orga 
nizations need to depend on the dialogical patterns of collective action in addition to the 
monological patterns of collective action puts unions at a dISadvantage m relation to capital 
organizations, which can depend solely on monological patterns. 
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団体交渉の分散化の組合内政治に対する影響
鈴木玲
本論文は、団体交渉の分散化が組合内の政治過程にどのような影響を及ぼ
すのかについて検討する。第一に、組合員の利益の定義に関する理論を検討
する。そして、それらの理論に基づき、組合内政治が活発または不活発にな
る条件を指摘する。第二に、団体交渉の企業レベルへの分散化に関する研究
（「交叉階級的連合」論と「日本化j論）を検討する。第三に、企業レベルへ
の団体交渉の分散化と組合内政治の活発さの程度の関連について考察する。
本論文の中心議論は、組合員の企業に対する認識が組合内政治の活発さの度
合いを説明する重要な要因であるということである。 ~pち、企業が社会組織
として認識される場合、組合内政治は不活発になりやすい。一方、企業が経
済組織として認識される場合、組合内政治は活発になりやすい。第四に、本
論分は上記の議論の例証として、全米自動車労組NUMMI(New United Motor 
Manufacturing, Inc.）支部と日立製作所の組合内政治を分析する。
